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In the aftermath of the subprime crisis that rocked the world in 2007, there has been a 
marked effort to review the oversight of financial markets and specifically financial 
institutions globally.  The crisis which saw the demise of long standing institutions such 
as Lehman Brothers underscored the importance of the regulation of global financial 
markets. Central Banks worldwide have been apportioned some of the blame in the 
episode for falling asleep at the wheel, investigations and inquiries into the crisis exposed 
the fact that many Central Bankers were not in tangent with the developments in the 
financial markets and in some cases did not have a clear handle and understanding of the 
many instruments that were introduced into the markets. Consequently, many 
governments have made radical changes to their Central Banking operations in a bid to 
ensure better oversight of their economies. The main discourse over Central Banking has 
been the separation or alignment of the two main activities of the banks – 
microeconomic and macroeconomic regulation. There is no clear cut consensus from 
studies into these variants that one option supersedes the other. Thus it can be argued 
that there are other variables in specific economies that should come in to play in arriving 
at this decision. Whatever approach may be adopted, it is a very important role that sets 
the tone for economic development in any country. Like its counterparts worldwide, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria also contemplated making changes to its operational structure. 




This work will review the role of the Central Bank of Nigeria in prudential regulation 
and recommend an approach that would work for a developing country in Sub-Saharan 

























Prudential regulation is an important part of the key activities of any economy involving 
the supervision of financial institutions. They are important players in the financial 
markets and should have their activities under surveillance to ensure that there is stability 
in the financial system and deposits taken from the public are safe and secure. The 
occurrence of the sub-prime crisis in late 2007 showed the importance of this role by 
Central Bankers and also the enormous influence that financial institutions wield within 
the global economy.  The effect of the meltdown during that period still reverberates 
globally with many economies struggling to recover from the attendant downturn that 
occurred. 
 
In every region there is a lot of rhetoric on the structure of Central Banking and where 
prudential regulation should be placed in that structure. This study highlights the fact 
that there is no model that fits all situations. There are pros and cons to whichever 
method is adopted by regulatory authorities and it is also dependent on other factors such 
as the level of development and sophistication in the economy being considered. The 
main focus will be on the prudential regulation activities of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
and will attempt a review of the effectiveness of the adopted structure. As with many 
structural policies that emanate from developed countries, it has been widely 
acknowledged that these policies require adaption to work in developing countries. 




Overall, this paper will seek to recommend appropriate structures that can be applicable 
in developing/third world countries.  
 
The first chapter will review the current literature on separation of the dual roles of 
Central Banks – Monetary Policy and Prudential Regulation. As highlighted above there 
is no consensus on which option is superior. Chapter Two of this study is an in-depth 
analysis of the banking supervision structure in Nigeria and will also give an overview of 
Nigeria financial markets for a holistic perspective. 
 
The third chapter will review the impact of the global financial crisis on Nigeria‟s 
banking sector and the central bank‟s response to the crisis. It will also outline the 
peculiar factors that affect the performance of the bank in the Nigerian environment. 
Particular attention will be paid to the recent bank failures in the after math of the 
subprime crisis. The main issues that caused the collapse of these institutions will be 
critically examined to determine if the failures could have been avoided if there was a 
specialist agency set apart to supervise banking activities in the country. 
 
The final Chapter concludes the finding of the study and recommends lasting reform for 
the operational independence of the Central Bank in the supervision of banks and the 
infrastructure that needs to be in place for the Bank to live up to expectation in a 
complex environment like Nigeria. Key issues to be discussed here will be the corruption 
pervasive in the country as a whole and capacity building in the Central Bank at large.  





The Organisational Structure of Central Banks 
1.1 The Role of Central Banks 
 
Central banks perform two main functions namely macroeconomic and microeconomic 
regulation. These activities are very closely inter-related because the achievement of 
monetary and price stability rests on maintaining micro-level financial stability in the 
payments and banking system (Goodhart, 2000)1. However in the last decade there has 
been more and more separation of these two functions by policy makers. Examples 
where this has occurred include the United Kingdom where the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) was established in June 1998 to supervise Financial Institutions. 
Following this move by the United Kingdom, we had more and more European 
countries follow the same trend (Masciandaro, Quintyn, 2009)2. Between the years 
1998-2008, many countries also made changes to their supervisory structure 
(Masciandaro, Quintyn, 2009)3. It is noteworthy that in studies conducted countries with 
a developed financial system did not have central bank exclusivity over banking 
supervision but rather this was the case in less developed countries with little or no 
                                                             
1 Goodhart, “The Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision” (2000), Financial Stability Institute 
Occasional papers No 1 
 
2
 Masciandro, Quintyn, “ Reforming Financial Supervision and the role of Central Banks: A review of global 
trends, causes and effects (1998 – 2008)” (2009), Centre for Economic Policy Research Policy Insight No 30 
 
3Ibid 3 




international bank presence (Blei, 2001)4. The reason for these changes are the more 
complex nature of financial markets and the seeming blur between the various kind of 
financial institutions operating in the markets however in light of the rude awakening in 
2007-2008 with the global crisis, there are attempts worldwide by policy makers to 
revisit their regulatory structure. 
 
It has been established that the two roles of the Central Bank are interlinked and thus one 
would rationally expect that the roles would be kept in a single entity however the policy 
reforms of the decade 1998 -2008 proved otherwise and we shall examine the argument 
for and against separation of the banking supervision mandate of the Central Bank. 
1.2   Arguments for the Separation of Banking Supervision 
 
Despite the interconnectedness of both roles of the Central Bank, many policy makers 
went ahead to separate both functions with the most notable being the United Kingdom. 
The following were the rationale for splitting the functions   -  
1.2.1 – Conflict of Interest 
 
The conflict of interest argument is hinged on the possibility that supervisory concern 
about the fragility of the banking system might influence the central bank to allow a more 
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accommodating monetary policy regime to ensure for price stability (ECB, 2001)5. It is 
reasoned that with sole discretion of monetising financial distress, a central bank can 
even fuel a systemic risk because bailing out the financial system can ultimately derail 
monetary policy and aggravate financial instability6. 
 
Expanding on the conflict of interest argument, Goodhart and Schoemaker 7(1995) 
further argued that the cyclical effects of both regulatory and monetary policy tend to 
conflict. They opined that monetary policy tend to be counter-cyclical whilst regulation 
is pro-cyclical stating further that it is harder to increase capital during a recession when 
bank costs are high and profits are very low. Studies by Heller (1991)8 have shown that 
inflation rates are higher in economies where the central bank partakes in regulation of 
banks. This is also corroborated in studies by Di Giorgio and Di Noia (1999)9 which 
revealed that in countries where the central bank is the sole supervisor, inflation rates are 
twice as high as in other economies.  
 
                                                             
5 European Central Bank, “The role of Central Bank in Prudential Supervision”  (2001) 
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/prudentialsupcbrole_en.pdf 
 
6 Jacome, “Central Bank Involvement in Banking Crisis in Latin America” (2008) IMF working Paper series WP 
08/135 
 
7 Goodhart, Schoenmaker, “Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?” 
(1995), Oxford Economic Papers, 47, 539–60. 
 
8 Heller, “Prudential Supervision and Monetary Policy‟, (1991) in J. Frenkel and M. Goldstein, eds, Essays in 
Honor of Jacques Pollack. Washington, DC: IMF, 269-281 
 
9 Di Giorgio, Di Noia, „Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be given to Different Agencies? 
(1999) International Finance 2:3, 361-378 
 





1.2.1 – Excessive Power 
 
One of the reasons against the supervision of banks by the central bank is excessive 
power in the hands of select individuals whose accountability may be weak (Llewellyn, 
2006)10. If a central bank has the sole discretion to set interest rates in addition to 
supervisory powers for the banking sector it is considered risky to allow the 
concentration of such powers in the hands of unelected officials (Masciandaro, 2006)11. 
One of the consequences of above is a moral hazard issue which sends a wrong signal to 
the public that the safety net implicit guarantee by the central banks is available to every 
type of deposit institution (Herring, Carmassi, 2008)12. 
 
1.2.3 - Reputation Risks  
 
A clamour for separation is rooted in the fact that the risk of reputational losses increases 
when a central bank has sole responsibility for banking supervision. This is occasioned by 
the fact that supervision entails a higher visibility of failures than flagships (Goodhart, 
                                                             
10 Llewellyn, “Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues” (2006), Paper 
presented at World Bank Seminar – Aligning Supervisory Structures with Country Needs 
 
11 Masciandaro, “E Pluribus Unum? Authorities Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants” 
(2006) Open Economies Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 , 73-102  
 
12 Herring, Carmassi, “The Structure of Cross-Sector financial Supervision” (2008), Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Instruments, Vol. 17, No. 1, 51-76 




2000)13. This further cause‟s complicity where in order to stem reputational losses the 
bank may accommodate bail out pressures using liquidity tools (Masciandaro et al, 
2010)14. Because reputation and credibility are crucial for effectiveness of monetary 
policy, central banks are better off veering away from banking supervision. 
 
1.2.4 – The Changing Structure of the Financial System 
 
Hitherto, banking was limited to financial intermediation by commercial banks and with 
the onset of other non-bank financial institutions there were clear cut demarcation 
between the activities of the various institutions (Goodhart, 2000)15. The regulation of 
these activities would be mainly protecting consumer interest and welfare which were 
issues that were of little significance to the central bank (Blei, 2005)16. These previously 
determinable distinctions are now blurred with the advent of universal banking and the 
sophistication in financial instruments (Borio, Filosa, 1994)17. Many policy makers made 
changes in the regulatory structure to accommodate the changing landscape of the 
market. 
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 Ibid 2 
 
14 Masciandaro, Pellegrina, Pansini, “Governments, Central Banks and Banking Supervision Reforms: Does 
Independence Matter?” (2010) Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2010-74 
 
15 Ibid 2 
16 Ibid 1 
 
17Borio, Filosa, “The Changing Borders of Banking: Trends and Implications” (1994) BIS Economic Paper, No. 43 
 




1.3 – Arguments for Unifying Banking Supervision 
1.3.1 – Information Related Synergies 
 
Because prudential regulation is closely related to macro-economic policy, it has been 
argued widely that both operations should reside in a unified agency. Data from the 
banking sector is a critical input into the formation of macroeconomic policy thus there is 
a consensus that central banks ought to have direct involvement in this key variable for 
proper interpretation (Bernanke, 2007)18. Splitting the functions into two will be costly 
as there will be duplication of effort in collecting the information (Llewellyn, 2006)19. 
He stated further that central banks require information about the liquidity and solvency 
of banks when considering its lender of last resort role. Other arguments are that it is 
more difficult to coordinate between institutions than it is to coordinate between 
departments and institutions have an aversion for sharing information (Blei, 2005)20.  
 
1.3.2 – The Systemic Risk Argument 
 
Central Banks have a mandate for systemic risk which is a function of the prudential 
regulation of banks and the risk for the financial market as a whole thus it is more 
                                                             
18 Bernanke, “Central Banking and Banking Supervision in the US” (2007) Speech delivered at Allied Social 
Sciences  Association Meeting, Chicago 
 
19 Ibid 11 
20 Ibid 1 




practical for banking supervision to be undertaken by the central bank (ECB, 2001)21. 
The central banks focus on systemic stability allows them better perspective of the 
likelihood and potential impact of macro-shocks in both domestic and international 
markets whereas a separate agency focuses on issues bordering on investor protection 
(ECB, 2001)22. 
 
1.3.3. – Independence of Central Banks 
 
Central Banks are more likely to be independent from political and other external 
interference in carrying out banking supervision function. They are also more likely to be 
immune from regulatory capture by the supervised institutions which is largely 
predominant in developing countries (Davis, Obasi, 2009)23.  
1.3.4 – Skilled Staff 
 
Proponents of the unified regulatory system have argued that central banks have the 
ability to hire more qualified staff (Quintyn, Taylor 2007)24. Due to its status and 
prestige, it is able to attract more qualified staff into the institution than an agency that is 
                                                             
21 Ibid 6 
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 Davis, Obasi, “The Effectiveness of Banking Supervision” (2007) Brunel University Economic and Finance 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 09-27 
 
24
 Quintyn, Taylor, “Building Supervisory Structures in Sub-Saharan Africa – An Analytical Framework” (2007) 
IMF Working Paper WP 07/18 




the offshoot of the central bank. This is all the more valid when regulators have to 
compete with the market to attract qualified personnel as supervisors. 
1.4 – Further Determinants of Banking Supervision Structure 
 
Apart from the clear cut pros and cons of either separation and unification of regulatory 
roles, there are other variables that have come about in the discourse of this topic which 
are discussed below. 
1.4.1 – Emerging/Developing Country 
 
Goodhart (2000)25 postulated in his paper that the arguments enumerated above will be 
secondary in the case of emerging countries and developing economies. Firstly, this is 
because the banking in developing countries is not as complex and sophisticated as 
obtained in developed countries. It is mainly restricted to core commercial banking thus 
the blurring of the boundaries between financial intermediaries and complexity of 
markets that give rise to structural changes in regulation are absent. Goodhart (2000)26 
also advanced the second reason as the tendency to focus more on systemic risk than 
prudential regulation and consumer interest because developing nations are more prone 
to systemic disturbances. Lastly the issue of personnel quality and status of the central 
bank in an emerging country is a key variable because they play important roles as 
specialist experts in international financial dealings and the perception of other central 
                                                             
25
 Ibid 2 
26 Ibid 2 




bankers is vital in maintaining confidence in the country‟s economy. The above 
explanations sheds more light on the unified approach of most developing countries, if 
there are any changes at all many are responding just like their counterparts worldwide 
on strengthening the structure of their regulation. 
 
1.4.2 – Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance as it relates to regulatory and supervisory organisation is a key 
consideration in organising the regulatory framework of any economy as a sound 
governance structure will enhance the reputation, credibility and effectiveness of an 
agency (Llewellyn, 2006)27. It is also pertinent that an agency is able to demonstrate its 
independence, integrity, transparency and accountability. 
 
1.4.3 – Regulatory Capture 
 
The literature of supervisory architecture has also been viewed from the political 
economy prism – this is the relationship between politics, government and bank 
supervision (Davis, Obasi, 2009)28 with all policymakers regarded as politicians. Two 
approaches have been identified in this arena called the public interest view and the 
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private interest view (Barth et al, 2004)29. The public interest view is where banks are 
directly regulated by government in every aspect from ownership to types of lending. 
This is evident in powerful supervisory agencies that have the power to completely 
oversee and discipline banks. The reverse is the case with private interest view where 
regulation is light and banks are allowed a free reign in their operations such that they can 
“capture” regulations and subvert the system to work in their interests (Barth et al, 
2004)30. 
 
The foregoing shows that there is no optimal regulatory structure but it would be 
dependent on the variables that are prevalent in the economy in question. Above all the 
political economy variable is a very important and crucial one that sets the tone for the 
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 Barth, Caprio, Levine, “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What works best?” (2004)  Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, Vol.13, No.2 , 205-248 
30 Ibid 30 





Central Bank of Nigeria’s Financial Regulatory Structure 
2.1 – Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agencies 
 
2.1.1 – The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)  
 
The CBN was established by the Central Bank Act 1958 (as amended) and commenced 
operation in July 1959. In 1969, the Banking Decree was also enacted giving full 
authority regarding banking business in the country. The mandate of CBN was as follows 
 
i. Issuance of legal tender 
ii. Maintain the external reserves of the country 
iii. Promote monetary stability and a sound financial environment 
iv. Lender of last resort  
v. Financial Adviser to the Government 
 
In 1991, the Banking Act of 1959 and the Banking Decree of 1969 were repealed and 
replaced with the Banks and other Financial Institutions (BOFI) Decrees 24 and 25 to 
strengthen CBN‟s position in its oversight of enacting monetary policy, banking 




regulation and supervision of all financial institutions in the country. The new decree 
brought non-bank financial intermediaries under the supervision of CBN. 
 
CBN lost its limited autonomy in 1997 with the enactment of the CBN Amendment 
Decree No.3 and BOFI (Amended) Decree No. 4. With the enactments of these laws, 
the CBN was effectively brought back under the control of the Ministry of Finance with 
regards to bank supervision and regulation. Under this regime the CBN played a 
relatively ineffective role in bank supervision and lacked any powers to carry out its 
duties judiciously.  
 
In 1998, the 1997 Decrees were repealed by the CBN Amendment Decree No. 37 and 
Bank and other Financial Institutions Decree No. 38 of 1998. These new decrees 
restored some measure of autonomy to the CBN. Specifically, they empowered the CBN 
to review or revoke banking licenses. In 1999 a further amendment to the BOFI decree 
was made - Bank and other Financial Institutions Decree No. 40 of 1999 allowing CBN 
to remove the officers of any financial institution and apply the rules applicable to failed 
banks to other non-bank financial institutions. A major change was the enactment of the 
CBN Act 2007 which repealed the CBN Act of 1991 and all its amendments. The 
consequence of the Act was that CBN became a fully autonomous body as regulator and 
its remit was enlarged to include serving as economic advisor to the Federal 
Government.  
 




In 1994, the CBN in a bid to ensure that there was some form of coordination in the 
activities of all the regulatory agencies for effective oversight of the financial sector 
established the Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC). It is 
noteworthy that the committee was only accorded legal status by the amendment to the 
CBN Act 1991 in 1998 and was formally inaugurated in 1999. The following institutions 
were members of the committee –  
 
i. Central Bank of Nigeria (Chairman) 
ii. Corporate Affairs Commission 
iii. Securities and Exchange Commission 
iv. Ministry of Finance 
v. Nigeria Insurance Commission 
 
2.1.2 – The Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) 
 
NDIC was established by the promulgation of Decree No.22 of 1988 due to the 
identified need to safeguard depositor‟s funds. With the liberalisation policy on the back 
of the Structural Adjustment Programme of the government in 1986, there was a 
proliferation of banks in Nigeria. The number of banks in Nigeria increased from 40 to 




120 between the periods 1986 – 1992 such that the banking landscape became mired in 
problems. These problems include the follow (NDIC)31 
 
i. Sharp practices due to increased competition in the industry 
ii. Unscrupulous individuals became promoters of financial institutions 
iii. Inadequate Skilled Manpower 
 
In 2006, the decree was repealed and replaced with the NDIC Act No. 16 of 2006 with 
the following public policy objectives32 
 
i. Protect small uninformed investors and less financially sophisticated depositors by 
providing an orderly means of compensation in the event of failure of financial 
institutions 
ii. Contribute to the financial system by making incidence of bank runs less likely 
iii. Enhancing public confidence and systemic stability by providing a framework for 
the resolution and orderly exit mechanisms for failing and failed institutions 
 
 





Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation ANNUAL REPORT 2009 - 
http://ndic.org.ng/files/NDIC_2009_ANNUAL_REPORT.pdf accessed 19/6/2011 
 




2.1.3   Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
Another key institution in the financial landscape in Nigeria is the Securities and 
Exchange Commission responsible for the oversight of Nigeria‟s capital market. SEC was 
promulgated under the SEC Decree number 71 of 1979 to replace the Capital Issues 
Commission. Prior to promulgation of SEC, the capital market regulation was carried 
out under the supervision of the CBN. The SEC Decree no 71 was repealed by the SEC 
Decree number 29 of 1998 and two further amendments were made in 1999 and 2007. 
SEC is currently governed by the Investment and Securities Act Number 29 of 2007. 
 
SEC is a member of the FSRCC and rightly so because of the importance of the capital 
market as a strong pillar for economic development in any country. The Nigerian capital 
market has a long run as one of the most profitable stock exchanges in the world and was 
the toast of many international investors but this trend reversed after the global financial 
crisis. Investigations into the slump of the capital market could be attributed partly to 
bank regulation failure which will be discussed later in this paper. 
2.2 – The Banking Supervision Structure 
 
Until 1965, the CBN operated a “scrutiny section” whose primary responsibility was the 
off-site supervision of banks with the Ministry of Finance taking charge of the on-site 
examination functions through the Banking Examination Department (BED). The 




banking supervision function was transferred fully to CBN in 1966 with the BED 
transferred and merged with the hitherto scrutiny section. The status quo held till 1977 
when the BED was renamed Banking Supervision Department (BSD) with four additional 
divisions created – Central Supervision, Field Examination, Financial Sector 
Development Division and Foreign Exchange inspectorate Division. 
 
In 1986, the Federal Government embarked on a liberalisation of the banking sector with 
the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme. As highlighted earlier the number 
of banks surged dramatically from 40 in 1986 to 120 in 1992 with a number of 
unscrupulous practices introduced into the sector. This led to the establishment of the 
NDIC as depositors‟ funds insurer and also to complement activities of CBN with on-site 
and off-site supervision. Accordingly, the BSD was now split into BED and BSD and 
assigned on-site and off-site responsibilities. The Central Bank continued to operate this 
method until the outbreak of the subprime crisis which led to major reforms in the 
banking supervision mandate of the bank. 
 
As banking regulator in Nigeria, a developing country, CBN plays an important role in 
the development of the economy. Banks which are under its purview are a major factor 
in the stimulating of economic activity in their role as financial intermediaries. In light of 
the recent global financial crisis we will in particular assess the effectiveness of prudential 
regulation by looking at banking reforms attempts and attendant bank failures in Nigeria 
to date and reasons that can be attributed to the situation. 




2.3 – Evolution of Banking Sector in Nigeria 
 
Prior to the establishment of the CBN, there was a proliferation of indigenous banks to 
2533 between the years 1947-1952 however by 1954 21 of these banks had collapsed.  
This first financial crisis was mainly due to undercapitalisation, weak management, 
absence of corporate governance structures, overtrading and poor asset management34  
 
After independence in 1960, the Nigerian financial landscape was mainly dominated by 
foreign and government owned banks. The few indigenous banks that were established 
did not fare well as highlighted above. With the establishment of the CBN in 1959, there 
was a phase of regulatory control over the activities of banks in the country. This also 
marked the beginning of the development of the money and financial sector in the 
economy. Between 1959 and 1960, there were 8 additional bank licences granted to 
banks and this brought the number of banks in Nigeria to 12 by 1960 with a further 
increase to 17 by 196235.Policy changes at this time to strengthen these institutions were 
the use of the policy of directed credit, control of the interest rate and a significant 
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34 Aruwa, S., “Market-Induced Consolidation in Post Consolidation Banking Era”, (2008), Academy Journal Of 
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increase in the paid up capital required for the establishment of new banks. The paid up 
capital as set up by CBN in 1958 was N400,00036. In the following years there was a 
huge growth in the number of banks, and by 1978 – the number of banks has increased 
to 45 with paid up capital requirement of N1,500,000 by the Central Bank.37 
 
Between 1979 and 1987, a further 9 banks were licensed bringing the total number of 
banks to 54 with a paid up requirement of N2,000,000 for Merchant Banks. Most of the 
banks that were licensed during this period were local private investors who entered a 
space that was hitherto dominated by foreign and government owned banks. One of the 
major aims was to correct deficiencies in the financial intermediation as the attention of 
these banks was focused on the corporate sector to the detriment of the growing 
domestic private sector. The other reasons were the relative ease to obtain a banking 
license due to the minimal entry requirements and the opportunity to profit on a scale 
not seen in other sectors of the economy38. 
 
2.3.1 – Banking Sector Reforms in Nigeria 
 
Before the 1980‟s, bank supervision and prudential regulation was not accorded much 
importance in many developing countries because they had financial regimes that were 
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essential controlled by the government for economic, social and political objectives.39 
With the financial crisis that started in the 1980‟s, many low developing countries 
embarked on reforms of their financial sectors mainly in response to conditionality‟s 
attached to loans from multilateral agencies like the World Bank40. Nigeria was no 
exception in this vanguard and the mid-1980s saw a major step in ensuring a sound 
banking sector to protect against any systemic risk and ensure that the path to economic 
stability was sustained. 
 
The start of radical financial sector reform was a vital portion of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme which was introduced in 1986; this programme was adopted by 
Nigeria upon rejection of an International Monetary Fund loan due to the conditionality‟s 
that were attached. The reform agenda in the financial sector was three pronged- 
deregulation of interest rates, exchange rates and entry/exit into the banking business41. 
The objective of these reforms was essentially to ensure that the banking sector was in a 
position to play its role of intermediation and thereby constitute a viable engine in 
economic development. 
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Following this initiative, a major policy advent by the CBN was the introduction of 
prudential guidelines in 1990. The guidelines were created for the following reasons42: 
 
1. Ensure a more prudent approach in their credit portfolio classification, provision 
for non-performing loans, credit portfolio disclosure and interest accrual on non-
performing assets 
2. Ensure uniformity of their approach in 1 above and ensure reliability of published 
accounting information and operation. 
 
With the liberalisation of the economy, the number of banks by 1991 has grown to 119 
from 40 in 1986 with paid up capital base of N20,000,000 and N12,000,000 for 
commercial and merchants banks respectively. Credit ceilings limits were removed from 
banks that were determined to meet certain criteria – cash reserve, Liquidity ratio, 
prudential guidelines, statutory minimum paid up capital, capital adequacy ratio and 
sound management43. Eighty banks in number qualified to have their credit limits 
removed after meeting stipulated criteria by CBN. 
 
The rapid proliferation of banks had its pros and cons for the economy and the banking 
system at large. A major advantage was that the new banks were targeting local and 
private businesses that the foreign and government banks tended to ignore. The attention 
of these banks was skewed to the private sector and multinationals who were key clients 
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for many banks at the time44. Genuine investors were able to take advantage of this gap 
by lending to small and medium scale enterprises and in some cases offered better 
services than the established banks. 
 
Because of the relative low barrier to entry in terms of paid up capital, many unworthy 
investors were also able to get their hand on bank licences. It is interesting to note that 
the applications did not have rigorous requirements in terms of expertise and neither did 
it state any grounds for declining banking applications45. One of the many incentives to a 
lot of investors was the foreign exchange market in Nigeria which has been liberalised in 
the financial sector reform. In fact, many banks that were established at this time were 
simply for the sole aim of getting a foreign exchange allocation from the central Bank of 
Nigeria and selling it at a premium on the “black” market. This was an extremely 
lucrative business and for many banks, it was a primary source of their profitability. Also 
many bank promoters had the sole aim of funding their own businesses via the banks. 
There were very many indiscriminate lending practices in a number of these banks and 
because of the really high leverage employed by these institutions, the owners did not 
have much to lose in terms of eroded capital. It is noteworthy that very many of the bank 
directors in the proliferation wave were retired military officers who had hitherto ruled 
Nigeria in the 1970‟s. It has been widely acknowledge that many of them leveraged on 
their contacts in government to ensure that they got regular foreign exchange allocations 
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and influenced government ministries and agencies to deposit large funds with them 
making for non-reliance on depositors funds for quite a number of banks. 
 
In 1991 and 1997, CBN made two further increases to the minimum paid up capital of 
banks culminating in N500,000,000. During these years the second wave of bank failures 
was witnessed in Nigeria. By 1991, cracks were already evident in the balance sheets of 
many banks, one of the measures that CBN had taken as part of the financial sector 
reform was the instruction to all government ministries and agencies to recall their funds 
deposited with banks and return same to CBN. As highlighted above, this was a major 
source of funding for many banks and straightway brought about considerable stress on 
these banks‟ balance sheets. Indeed during this period, there was an embargo on the 
licensing of new banks and by 2003, there were only 89 banks left with others technically 
insolvent and liquidated. Capital requirement of banks was also increased to N2bn in 
2003. 
 
Interestingly, the factors that were responsible for the failure of the banks in the second 
wave were no radically different from the reasons responsible for the failure of the 
indigenous banks prior to the establishment of CBN. These factors will be considered in 
depth in the next chapter. However the status quo continued until the banking 
consolidation exercise of 2005 which was a significant milestone in banking reforms in 
Nigeria. 
 




2.3.2 – Banking consolidation in Nigeria 
 
In 2004, the CBN embarked on a major reform programme by increasing the paid up 
capital of banks from N2bn to N25bn and banks were encouraged to embark on a merger 
and acquisition programme to meet up with the requirement. At this time only 62 banks 
were classified as sound/satisfactory with the rest classified as marginal/unsound46. 
There was a lot of criticism at the time that this radical reform was ill-timed in light of 
the economic challenges facing the country. The aims of the policy reform as outlined by 
CBN were as follows47 -  
 
i. Ensure minimal reliance on public sector funds 
ii. Adoption of risk-focused and rule-based regulatory framework 
iii. Adoption of zero-tolerance in regulatory framework and data/information 
rendition/reporting 
iv. Stricter enforcement of corporate governance principles for banking and revision 
of relevant laws for effective corporate governance  
v. Expeditious process for rendition of returns by banks and other financial 
institutions through electronic Financial Analysis and Surveillance system (E-
FASS) 
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vi. Ensuring greater transparency and accountability in the implementation of 
banking laws and regulation 
vii. The establishment of an asset management company as an important element of 
distress resolution. 
 
By the end of the deadline given to the banks, 89 banks had whittled down to 25 banks 
approved and 13 liquidated banks. This development was regarded as positive for the 
banking sector as the institutions now had adequate capital to withstand shocks in the 
system but also to enable them operate in the global market space. On the other hand 
many opined that there were fundamental problems to be addressed and that simply 
merging the banks would not ensure a stable banking sector. Prior to this time most 
Nigerian banks has a capital base that was less than $10m, to put this in context the 
largest bank in Nigeria has a capital base of $240m compared with $526m for the 
smallest bank in Malaysia48. 
 
The emergence of 25 strong banks was widely celebrated by the CBN and the populace 
at large as it was a milestone achievement and streamlined the banking sector to a 
manageable number of players. The banks continued to post bumper profits and in fact 
many posted record profitability after the merger exercise. This was all good until the 
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onset of the global crisis which threw up a can of worms in the sector that was beyond 




















Nigerian Banking Sector and the Global Financial Crisis 
3.1 - The Effect on the Banking Sector 
 
The Subprime crisis that engulfed the world in 2007 reverberated in all economies. 
Developing economies like Nigeria‟s did not feel the first wave of the crisis as the 
financial sector is not fully integrated with the global markets; it was the second wave 
that hit Nigeria and exposed the sordid on goings in the financial sector. The first hit for 
the Nigerian economy was the reduction in oil revenue for government as this was a 
major source of income for the country. Government has to resort to dipping into the 
excess crude oil account and domestic borrowing to meet its obligations with the 
attendant effect of a devaluation of the currency. Foreign direct investment and foreign 
trade finance lines for banks were significantly reduced but the greatest impact was in the 
capital market49.  Nigeria‟s capital market the darling of foreign investors saw a huge 
withdrawal of these funds when the crisis kicked in, the Nigeria Stock Exchange all share 
index which gained a record 74.73% in 2007 has slumped by 45.8% as at close of 
200850. 
 
                                                             
49
 Ibid  
 
50
 Oteh, A, “From Crisis to a World Class Market” (2010) 
http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/speech%20-%20from%20crisis%20to%20a%20world%20class%20market.pdf 
 




These twin effects – the reduction in global oil prices and the slump in the Nigerian stock 
exchange threatened to pull down the entire banking sector. Between 2004 and 2008, 
there was an upswing in oil prices culminating in huge foreign exchange inflow and 
attendant increase in economic growth. Consequently, there was huge liquidity in the 
system and the excess was channelled to the stock market explaining its impressive 
performance. Also banks used this as an opportunity to bolster their capital base. By the 
end of 2008, banking stocks made up 60% of the market capitalisation. 
 
In a bid to utilise the significant capital and liquidity at their disposal, banks set about 
creating risk assets where they had no expertise especially margin lending and oil and gas 
financing. By end of December 2008, the banks total exposure to the oil and gas industry 
had accumulated to N750bn, representing 10% of industry assets and over 27% of 
shareholders‟ funds whilst exposure to the stock market was N1.6 trillion51. 
 
In the words of the current CBN Governor “when the global financial crisis set in mid-
2008 the domestic financial system was already engulfed by several interdependent 
factors that led to the re-emergence of an extremely fragile financial system to pre-
consolidation era. Indeed, the Nigerian banking sector was thrown into severe crisis as 
many banks became distressed52.” 
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The CBN took various initiatives to contain the distress but the banking system remained 
fragile and was virtually at the point of collapse. One of the measures taken by the CBN 
was the expansion of its discount window to 360 days to allow banks restructure their 
margin loans. Similar measures included progressive reduction of cash reserve ratio from 
4.0% to 1.0% and liquidity ratio from 40.0% to 25.0% to further ease the liquidity 
crunch. Despite these far-reaching measures, nine banks remained perpetual borrowers 
at the discount window and posed a risk to the collapse of the financial system. 
 
With a view to solving the problem, a special joint audit of all banks was embarked upon 
by the CBN and NDIC to assess the true financial condition of the banks; the result of 
this audit exhumed the rot that had hitherto plagued the banking system in Nigeria and 
resulted in the removal of 8 bank managing directors. 
 
3.1.1 – The CBN/NDIC Special Bank Audit 
 
As highlighted above, with the threat of imminent collapse of the financial sector, the 
CBN/NDIC commenced a special investigation into the books of the 25 banks that also 
included a diagnostic audit carried out through independent consultants. The results of 
the tests showed that 9 banks were technically insolvent on account of capital, liquidity 




and corporate governance problems revealing illegal activities that had been taking place 
in a few of the affected banks53.  
 
Five of these banks were in grave danger and constituted a systemic risk to the sector at 
large such that the CBN had to guarantee all inter-bank loans to these banks to prop up 
the market. Available results from the tests showed that the five banks had aggregate non 
performing loan portfolios of 40.8% and accounted for a significant proportion of total 
bank exposure to the stock market and oil and gas sector. Furthermore the banks 
accounted for 39.93% of total sector loans, 29.99% of deposits and 31.47% of total 
assets as at the 31st May 200954. 
 
On the basis of the report of the special audit and invoking the powers of the CBN 
governor as contained in Sections 33 and 35 of the Banks and other Financial Institutions 
Act 1991, the Managing Director and the Executive Directors of the following banks 
were removed –  
 
1. Afribank Plc 
2. Intercontinental Bank Plc 
3. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc 
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4. Oceanic Bank International Plc 
5. Finbank Plc 
 
The CBN also went further to inject N400bn into the banks in the form of Tier 2 capital 
to be repaid from the proceeds of future capitalisation of the banks. The funds would be 
divested as soon as new investors took over the banks. In addition to the above, the CBN 
broke the traditional banker-customer relationship by publishing the names of all the bad 
debtors of these banks in the daily newspapers and collaborated with the law 
enforcement and anti-corruption agencies to recover the loans. 
3.2 – Cause of Bank failures in Nigeria 
 
The sacking of Managing Directors and Executive Directors in the five banks was an 
event that was long overdue in Nigeria. The report of the special audit into the activity of 
banks did not reveal anything radically different from the earliest failures in the market in 
the pre-independence days and late 1980‟s. In the following section we will look at the 
specific problems highlighted in the banks from these prisms – Institutional, Economic 
and Political Factors55 
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3.2.1 – Institutional Factors 
 
i. Weak Corporate Governance/Insider Loans 
 
At the heart of every bank failure in Nigeria is the discovery that there are weak 
corporate governance measures in the banks. Many banking licences in Nigeria had been 
given to people who were highly connected to the government so there was difficulty in 
ensuring that corporate governance standards were adhered to. It was a known fact that 
decisions were given social and political considerations rather than implementing 
decisions that were in the best interest of the institution56. In addition many private 
investors saw the banks as a personal business with children and family members who 
were not qualified in any way occupying key positions in the bank57. With the 
proliferation in the 1980‟s, most of Nigeria‟s elite families had key stake holdings with 
the public perception that this was their bank. The consequence of this quantum leap in 
the number of banks was the lack of skilled personnel in the industry. A number of 
bankers rose rapidly through the ranks by moving jobs frequently giving rise to many 
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inexperienced senior managers in the sector. The current CBN Governor did 
acknowledge that this was the principal factor contributing to the financial crisis58. 
Examples of the extent of the criminality exhibited by bank management included the 
establishment of Special Purpose Vehicles to lend money to themselves for stock price 
manipulation and purchase of real estate all over the world59. One of the troubled banks 
borrowed money to buy jets only to have them registered in the CEO‟s sons name – he 
was the Chief Operating Officer of the bank! In another bank, the management set up 
100 fake companies for the sake of perpetuating fraud. Suffice to say, CBN did have 
corporate governances codes in place but these were not enforced in any way60. 
Below table indicates the level of insider loans in some failed banks in the second banking 
crisis of the late 1980‟s61. It is instructive to note that many of the directors of these 
banks had taken these loans with no intention of paying back. The banks usually 
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Table 3.1 – Insider Loans at Some Failed Banks 
 
Bank No. of Directors  
Involved 
Amount as at Closure 
(N) 
% of Total Risk 
Assets 
Alpha Merchant Bank Plc 11 1,314,418,700.43 33% 
United Commercial Bank 
Ltd 
5 741,755,808.86 30% 





Highland Bank of Nigeria 
plc 
12 33,197,157.58 38% 





ABC Merchant Bank Ltd 8 272,981,634.00 49% 
Royal Merchant Bank Ltd 7 646,940,182.23 69% 
North-South Bank of 
Nigeria Ltd 
13 240,668,637.62 32% 
Abacus Merchant Bank 
Ltd 
14 568,888,254.11 47% 
Credite Bank Nigeria Ltd 6 379,634,611.47 76% 
Prime Merchant Bank Ltd 1 539,292,310 64% 
Amicable Bank of Nig Ltd 7 149,854,896.00 56% 
Century Merchant Bank 
Ltd 
5 272,072,261.00 32% 
Group Merchant Bank Ltd 13 595,836,077.20 80% 
Commerce Bank plc 4 1,294,851,665.64 52% 
Pinnacle Commercial 
Bank Ltd 
10 298,766,751.76 20% 
Republic Bank Ltd 1 161,375,466.00 38% 
Source: NDIC 
 
ii. Inadequate Risk Asset Management 
 
Many banks did not have credit policies in place to guide them in the creation of risk 
assets and even when they were in place, they were not strictly adhered to by the banks. 
Loans were given out without due consideration to the ability of the customer to repay, 




many loans were given out as order from above in the case of many institutions to friends 
and associates of the directors and owners of the business62. In addition many loans were 
given out with highly overvalued assets as collateral and in some cases no collateral at all 
gambling with depositors funds63. There was also a large asset and liability mismatch in 
the balance sheet of many banks, a lot had hitherto relied on public sector funding for 
liability generation and when these funds were recalled from banks threw many into 
serious problems.  
Expectedly, this put a lot of strain on the capital of banks and is clearly reflected in 
CBN‟s response by regularly increasing the capital limit at every banking policy reform.  
iii. Inadequate Disclosure 
 
It is widely acknowledge amongst banking operators in Nigeria that only very few banks 
report accurate data to CBN in their monthly returns. Therefore with inaccurate data it 
would be extremely difficult for the CBN to understand what is truly going on in the 
banking sector. It is also unnerving to note that some of the banks that have failed in the 
wake of subprime also had positive ratings from reputable credit agencies such as Fitch. 
The banks were also able to sway the banking public with selective disclosure of certain 
aspects of their balance sheets highlighting their ever-increasing billion naira albeit non-
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existent profits. This sent out the wrong message to the investing populace with many 
unwary investors drawn to the banking stocks in the capital market  
3.2.2 Economic Factors 
 
Nigeria is a mono income country relying mainly on oil revenue for economic growth. In 
every cycle of bank failure, oil price volatility has always been a trigger in straining the 
system due to inadequate policy response. 
During the banking failures in the late 1980‟s the collapse of oil prices was the main 
trigger that brought about low economic growth and high level  of inflation making it 
difficult for existing borrowers to service their loans. To address these concerns, the 
Structural Adjustment Programme was embarked upon in 1986 with measures including 
liberalisation of bank licensing and deregulation of interest and exchange rates64. Whilst 
liberalising interest rates put pressure on borrowers, banks profited massively from the 
exchange rate deregulation by simply purchasing foreign exchange from CBN and selling 
same at the parallel/black market. At this time, CBN also decided to withdraw public 
sector funds from banks thereby exacerbating the problem thus it was no surprise that 
within a decade over 20 banks had collapsed. 
The third wave of the banking crisis had its roots in the oil price increase between 2004 
and 2008. Government spending was in tandem with the increase in oil prices with the 
excess liquidity finding its way into the banking system. Banking assets increased four 
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times between these years with foray into margin loans and the oil and gas business. A lot 
of margin loans by the banks were actually proprietary trading activities disguised as 
loans. Consequently the Nigeria Stock Exchange index increased fivefold at its peak in 
2007 whilst banking stocks increased nine fold. The stock exchange attracted massive 
foreign investment for the best performance in the world; it was thus no surprise the dire 
crash that occurred once fortunes reversed at the onset of subprime. Regulatory 
authorities did not take adequate measures to ensure the massive liquidity did not flow 
into the banking market but rather embarked on a consolidation exercise which 
worsened the situation – after the consolidation banking assets grew by 76% annually65. 
3.2.3 – Political Factors 
 
Political instability in Nigeria also has its place in the discourse of banking failures. The 
tension between military and democratic rule took its toll on the banking sector in the 
late 1980‟s to early 1990‟s with the panicking populace withdrawing massively from the 
banks. 
The licensing of banks in Nigeria was also a very political process. Many banks today 
count amongst the majority shareholders Nigeria‟s social elite and retired military 
officers.  Of equal importance is the political will to fight the menace in the banking 
industry, the CBN sometimes is handicapped because a lot of the bank failure culprits are 
the untouchables of society. In fact the first significant step to bring bank defaulters to 
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book was the promulgation of the Failed Banks and Financial Malpractices Act of 1994 
and the setting up of a failed bank tribunal. Prior to this, many borrowers saw bank loans 
as their “share of the national cake”. The tribunal had 139 cases filed by the CBN with 44 
judgements delivered and 144 people convicted66. Suffice to say there were only very 
few “big fish” apprehended as those convicted were usually the managers in the bank 
taking instructions from above, many cases were transferred to the state courts with the 
closure of the tribunal culminating in a drastic slowdown in delivering judgement. In my 
opinion, it is fair to rationalise the problems in the banking sector as an expression of the 
endemic corruption the country. 
3.3 – Central Bank of Nigeria’s Role in Banking Crisis 
 
The aim in this part of the paper is to review the role of CBN as banking supervisor and 
regulator from the same three prisms used to highlight the banks failures. Evidently CBN 
also carries some of the blame in the debacle that has occurred in the banking crisis 
especially the third wave in the wake of the global financial crisis. It would be apt to say 
that CBN fell asleep at the wheel in its function as banking supervisor and regulator. 
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3.3.1 – Institutional Factors 
 
CBN was unable to unearth the practices going on at the banks not just because of an 
inadequate number of personnel but also skilled personnel.  With the liberalisation of the 
banking sector and the enormous jump in number of banks in the late 1980‟s, CBN was 
simply unable to cope as banking supervisor.  As a result of this, many banks went 
through the accounting year without an   on-site examination by banking supervisors and 
when this even happened the examination cycle which ought to have been yearly was 
conducted at intervals of two to three years67. The implication of this trend was that 
problems were always detected very late.  
Another significant issue was the fact that CBN banking examiners lacked the required 
expertise to detect fraudulent practices at the banks. The proliferation of banking 
institutions in Nigeria brought with it an information technology era thereby making it 
easy for data to be manipulated to facilitate window dressing of their balance sheets. The 
submission of monthly returns by banks to CBN was also plagued by inaccurate data 
inhibiting any quality trend analysis in many banks. It is however pertinent to mention 
that until the release of Statement of Accounting Standards No. 10 in 1990, there was no 
uniform reporting standard making it easy for inadequate disclosure by banks68. 
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CBN put in place an electronic rendition system (Financial Analysis and Surveillance 
System) to address this trend as part of the banking reform agenda in 200469. However 
the effect of this new application is not apparent as this problem of false data was still an 
issue in the banking crisis of 2008. Data from the banking sector is a key component of 
macroeconomic policies of any country thus reliance on this data did not augur well for 
the enactment of any meaningful policies. The emphasis on credit risks by the regulatory 
authorities also made them miss problems in the banks. It is only recently in line with 
international standards that the risk-based approach has been adopted by CBN banking 
supervisors. 
One of the problems with CBN as admitted by the Governor is the poor structure of the 
banking supervision department which has hindered effective monitoring and 
enforcement of regulation70. There were no specific individuals allocated to cover 
various aspects of the supervisory role, the on-site and off-site supervisory teams worked 
unilaterally as they were not even based in the same location. A major lapse that also 
came to light was that there were no exhaustive pre and post consolidation exercises 
even after the bank consolidation reform agenda was announced in 2004. 
 Another regulatory lapse was the lack of co-ordination between Financial Sector 
regulators, the CBN and SEC were unable to detect the sharp practices that many banks 
had adopted to invest in the stock market. Both institutions never exchanged any banking 
examination reports to enhance their oversight function considering the key importance 
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of the banking sector and capital market as engines of economic growth. On the part of 
the CBN, there was no comprehensive legal and regulatory framework to ensure that 
there was a clear mandate for banks to follow in margin lending activity. The FSRCC 
made up of representatives of the CBN, SEC, Nigeria Insurance Commission, Ministry of 
Finance and Corporate Affairs Commission did not meet in the two years before the 
subprime crisis induced failure7172. 
3.3.2 – Economic Factors 
 
A major failing of the CBN was inadequate macroeconomic policies to stem the tide of 
the economic downslide in the country. As already highlighted above, oil is a major 
revenue stream for Nigeria with the country very vulnerable to the volatility in global oil 
prices. It is instructive that there was no structure in place by the CBN to ensure that this 
was adequately managed in tandem with the banking sector. The aggressive lending being 
undertaken by banks and the financial bubble they created at the stock exchange was seen 
as indication of a growing and vibrant economy. It was not apparent to the regulators 
that the growth in these sectors without a commensurate increase in the activity of the 
real sector indicated that there was a problem at hand. Credit was not extended to vital 
sectors in the economy, unemployment remained high and many manufacturers were 
operating well below capacity. Infrastructure development was at its lowest ebb in the 
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country with poor transportation, electricity and inadequate housing for citizens. The 
human development indices of the United Nations rated Nigeria poorly; the only good 
news from Nigeria at the time was reporting of record profit levels by banks and 
accolades on having the most profitable stock exchange. 
Interestingly, many Nigerian banks and their Managing Directors received numerous 
international awards on the growth in the sector and innovation in banking thus giving a 
false assurance that things could be no better. 
3.3.3 - Political Factors 
 
The position of CBN Governor is a political appointment by the President; the 
nomination is forwarded to the legislators for screening and confirmation. It is 
noteworthy that due to Nigeria‟s multi-ethnicity, political appointments are made on 
what is called a zoning basis – shared out amongst the various ethnic zones to ensure a 
fair representation in government. This methodology is not in the best interest of the 
country as candidates with consummate expertise are many times over looked for 
political expediency. This arrangement makes it difficult for a CBN Governor to function 
effectively and be truly independent. Many of the promoters of banks in Nigeria are well 
connected politically with a number the major contributors to the campaigns of various 
members of the political class. Many banks have also been identified as accomplices in 
money laundering activities by the political class. Banking licences were awarded based 
on political connections and also led to regulatory forbearance in many instances. 




Professor Charles Soludo from East Nigeria was the CBN Governor between 2004 and 
2009, prior to this appointment he was the Chief Economic Adviser to Former President 
Olusegun Obasanjo (2001-2009) himself a southerner. Professor Soludo an accomplished 
economist of international repute73 was at the helm of affairs when the subprime crisis hit 
and he regularly assured the populace that the banks were able to absorb the shock from 
the global crisis as the country was not integrated to the global financial markets74. 
However, the difficulties in the banks were already apparent at this time and it is 
puzzling why the CBN Governor did not take far reaching measures to stem the decline 
in the system. The only tenable reason is regulatory forbearance with the expedient 
option to continue to fund these illiquid banks via the CBN expanded discount window. 
As soon as his predecessor Mallam Lamido Sanusi was appointed, he came in and took far 
reaching measures culminating in the removal of five Managing Directors of banks 
something that was hitherto inconceivable given the clout of the individuals involved. 
Mallam Sanusi was appointed by late President Umaru Yar‟Adua, both of them 
Northerners. The discourse in society was that Mallam Sanusi was on an agenda to take 
over the banks from southerners and easterners because the northerners did not have 
considerable stake in the banking sector75. 
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These are the kind of issues that regulators have to deal with in the political landscape 
and I would say that the country is lucky to have found someone who is fearless and 
ready to confront the system and tow the right path. He took the unusual step of 
publishing the names of all the bad debtors of banks in the national dailies and of course, 
it was no surprise that the majority on the list were the top echelon of society – 
politicians, their cronies and the elite. Many banks due to their political inclinations were 
obliged to give out loans to politicians and their cronies. Also with the government being 
the biggest spender, such favours were rewarded with government patronage for cash 
collection services or deposit placements by government agencies. Below is a direct 
quote from current governor Mallam Lamido Sanusi76 -  
“The sad story in all of this is we now have evidence that junior officers in the CBN did 
document their concerns to CBN top management at that time, but no action was taken. 
We also have evidence that the NDIC documented its concerns but its efforts to get the 
CBN leadership to act quickly were rebuffed.” 
Legal action was jointly taken by the CBN and Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) against erring bank directors and their accomplices. The following 
table shows the charges against them and the amount they have fleeced off the banks by 
virtue of the position of trust that they held. 
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Table 3.2 – CBN/EFCC Charges against Bank Managing Directors 
 
Name Amount Case Status 
Mrs Cecilia Ibru – Oceanic Bank N160.2bn Plea Bargain – sentenced for 18 
months on 8/10/10 and also 
forfeited assets worth N191.0bn 
Dr. B. Ebong – Union Bank N187.1bn On Bail 
Mr Okey Nwosu – FinBank  N95.1bn On Bail 
Mr Francis Atuche – Bank PHB N80.0bn On Bail, Assets frozen 
Dr E. Akingbola – 
Intercontinental Bank  
N27.0 bn On Bail, Assets frozen 
Source – EFCC Website77 
 
As highlighted in above table the only trial that has been concluded is that of Mrs Cecilia 
Ibru who entered into a plea bargain with the authorities, the other cases have been going 
in and out of court. This is another problem that regulators face in carrying out their 
duties. The judicial process in Nigeria is excruciatingly slow and constant adjournments 
occasioned by delay tactics of defence lawyers sometimes make the plea bargain option 
very attractive. 
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3.4 – The Banking Sector Post Consolidation 
 
The 2004 reform agenda by CBN was certainly a step in the right direction but there 
were a few lapses in the implementation of the initiatives. The main focus under the 
initiative was the recapitalisation of the banks from N2bn to N25bn in the space of 18 
months which has been considered to be a rather short grace period78. Furthermore, this 
decision was taken unilaterally by the CBN without reaching out to other operators to 
seek their input into the new paradigm being introduced in the banking sector. In 
developing countries such as Malaysia there were consultations with the market 
operators before embarking on mergers and acquisitions. This action by the CBN is 
typical of many policy upheavals in Nigeria; a global trend is copied without ensuring that 
the fundamentals to ensure that it produces desired results are in place. A school of 
thought opines that the consolidation exercise was ill timed given the economic condition 
and prevailing high inflation rate79. An example of this is the licensing of micro finance 
banks to drive the growth of small and medium scale enterprises in the country, however 
less than five years after their introduction, many of them have already run into liquidity 
problems with licences revoked by the CBN80.  
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Malaysia, a developing country like Nigeria was successful in its consolidation exercise 
because in addition to policy input by the operators in the sector the macroeconomic 
fundamentals were strong. The country had an inflation rate of 3.5% at the end of 1996 
whilst Thailand and Indonesia had 4.9% and 7.9% respectively. Another key measure 
that was put in place by the Malaysian Government was limiting the bank‟s exposure to 
the capital market and the real estate subsector. When it comes to bank consolidation, 
there are two views in the discourse, the first viewpoint is that it is well able to enhance 
banks overall returns via cost efficiency and revenue gains81. The second opinion is that it 
could encourage banks appetite for risk taking via the use of off-balance sheet operations 
and increased leverage82. 
In Nigeria, the consolidation exercise did increase risk taking with aggressive asset 
generation in the oil and gas industry and the stock market. This is in contrast to the 
Malaysian experience where regulators ensured that the excess liquidity was not put into 
sectors that could eventually harm the economy thus underscoring the importance of 
robust policy formation to avoid unintended consequences. 
The Nigerian banking system has witnessed a trend of boom and bust cycles. It seems to 
be the growth cycles occur once there are policies that enhance business opportunities in 
the banking sector and the bust eventually catches up due to mismanagement in the 
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sector. The present phase of reform embarked upon presents a viable opportunity for 
thorough overhaul of the financial sector by ensuring that the fundamental issues are 
dealt with regarding macroeconomic stability and the banking sector.  
In the aftermath of the subprime crisis, the CBN has now embarked on a long term 
reform programme targeted around 4 pillars83 
i. Enhancing the quality of banks  
ii. Establishing financial stability 
iii. Enabling Financial Sector Evolution 
iv. Ensuring the financial sector contributes to the real economy 
This approach deviates from the initially reform agenda in 2004 because it addresses the 
fundamental issues that afflict the banking sector in Nigeria. Reform in the industry will 
be unsustainable if these critical issues are not addressed.  
3.4.1 – CBN Four Pillar Reform Agenda 
 
Listed below is a breakdown of the specifics areas that will be addressed under each of 
the pillars of the new banking reform agenda84: 
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i. Enhancing the quality of Banks 
a. Industry remedial programmes to fix the cause of the crisis – risk 
management, data quality, governance and financial crime 
b. CBN has established an international risk management specialist function 
and is in the process of transitioning to risk-based supervision 
c. The FSRCC will lead a programme to fundamentally reform the financial 
services regulatory framework. The initial focus will be on harmonising 
and raising to world-class standards the supervision processes, technology 
and people within the various financial regulators 
d. CBN will take on the role of consumer protector in the banking sector, 
setting standards of customer service for the industry and ensuring that 
customers are treated fairly in their dealings with the industry. 
e. CBN will also enhance corporate governance internally to ensure that it is 
not dependent on leadership of the governor. The organisational structure 
within CBN is also been streamlined for effective supervision and 
regulation of the industry. 
ii.  Establishing Financial Stability 
a. The Financial Stability Committee will be strengthened within the CBN 
with a primary focus on systemic stability and will be supported by a 




strong technical working group. Also CBN will work closely with the 
Ministry of Finance to ensure consistency in monetary and fiscal policies 
b. Establishment of a hybrid monetary policy and macro-prudential rules. 
Under consideration is some form of oil priced linked provisioning regime 
in light of Nigeria‟s unique economic situation  
c. Development of directional economic policy to improve basic 
infrastructure, diversify the economy, increase the investment absorption 
capacity of priority sectors and support measures that enable sustainable 
economic growth. 
d. Further development of the capital market as an alternative to bank 
funding. This will ensure that long term funding is available for priority 
sectors in the economy. 
 
iii. Enabling healthy financial sector evolution 
a. CBN will play an important  role in facilitating establishment of 
complementary banking infrastructure such as credit bureaus and 
registrars. The creation of a credit bureau will help stem the menace of 
bad loans in the sector. 
b. Creation of the Asset Management Corporation to solve the non 
performing loan problems in banks and facilitate further consolidation in 
the market.  




c. CBN will review the current universal banking model and has released 
paid up share capital guidelines for specialist banks as follows –  
 
i. Regional - N10 billion 
ii. National - N25 billion 
iii. International - N50 billion 
iv. Ensuring the Financial sector contributes to the real economy 
 
a. Leverage the CBN Governors role as advisor to the President on economic 
matters to ensure that the financial sector contributes to the economy 
b. The following funds have been created to ensure infrastructure 
development and sustainable financing for the real sector. 
 
i. N500bn Critical Infrastructure Fund 
ii. N200bn Refinancing SME/Manufacturing Fund 
iii. N300bn Long Term Funding of Power and Aviation 
 
The above as compared to the 2004 reform agenda is a more holistic approach to 
addressing the fundamental issues that plague the Nigerian banking sector however the 
CBN will need to work closely with all other agencies to ensure that the long term plan 
can be followed through. It is desirable to have laudable initiatives but the right policy 




implementation is important, it will mark a turnaround in the sector if the political will 





















Conclusion and Recommendation 
4.1 – Financial Sector and Economic Growth 
Nigeria‟s economic growth has not been commensurate with the potential that is 
available to her. The growth has been stunted due to fundamental weaknesses like mono-
product economy and very poor infrastructure. The school of thought that reforming the 
banking sector without fixing the fundamental issues especially macro-economic stability 
is flawed, for Nigeria to harness its potential there should be reforms in all key sectors 
simultaneously. The latest reform agenda by CBN is a laudable plan that can deliver the 
required transformation if the implementation is right and the political will to make it 
happen is available. 
The growth and transformation of Nigeria‟s economy hinges on the appropriate 
management of the volatility and distortions that is experienced by the over-reliance on 
oil and rejuvenating the non-oil real economy to stimulate employment. Agriculture is 
an area that is a potential revenue generator for the government and should be 
encouraged to grow. It is only in addressing these macroeconomic variables alongside 
banking reforms that lasting change can occur in the banking sector. 





4.2 - Regulatory Agencies Reform 
A critical part of the reform agenda is the role of the regulatory agencies. The CBN on its 
own cannot deliver on the wide remit of the agenda thus all regulatory agencies need to 
work together to deliver the much required development to the economy. This is a 
laudable initiative and it is an opportunity to tackle what has long been identified as issues 
plaguing the nation. One of the key issues for the regulatory agencies themselves is 
getting skilled and experienced personnel from the banking sector to improve 
effectiveness of their roles. A key lapse that has come through is the lack of collaboration 
between the agencies. For instance, during the entire crisis the FSC and FSRCC never 
had regular meetings to get a holistic picture of the state of the economy. 
The regulatory agencies have started on internal reorganisations to meet the challenges 
and ensure better oversight of the sector. CBN as highlighted earlier has already started 
on a massive reorganisation of it departments for effective discharge of its duties. It has 
also strengthened its workforce with the employment of highly qualified citizens from 
the pool of talented Nigerians in developed countries.  
Similar reorganisation is also ongoing in SEC, the Director General Ms Arunma Oteh 
was also appointed by late President Musa Yar‟Adua. Since her appointment she has 
sacked the long standing Director-General of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) for 
alleged financial malpractices. In addition many securities firms and stock brokers were 




named as bad debtors in the name and shame tactic of the CBN and are currently 
undergoing investigation by SEC. 
To facilitate the reforms going on in the sector, a critical piece is the legal landscape of 
the nation. Judicial reform is vital in helping the agencies fulfil their mandates. In the case 
of the sacked managing directors in 2009 just one case has been concluded via a plea 
bargain. The other cases are been adjourned at every opportunity with defence lawyers 
having perfected the method to prolong the cases unnecessarily.  
A viable option is to re-introduce special courts to deal with these issues. This was an 
initiative that worked well with the establishment of the failed banks tribunal after the 
second banking crisis. This will ensure quick determination of charges against financial 
market operators and will serve as a deterrent in the market. This is an initiative that 
should be given urgent consideration because two vital financial market agencies in the 
market are opportune to have erudite professionals who possess the political will to 
enforce compliance with the rules no matter whose ox is gored. However these 
appointments are for a term of five years and it is probable that the individuals will be 
replaced at the expiration of their tenures in line with zoning method for political 
appointments in Nigeria. In my opinion, I believe that it is time for the country to ensure 
that vital agencies that require technical skills are not subjected to political manoeuvring 
but employ a methodology where the mantle falls on the most qualified persons 
available.  
 




4.2.1 – Separate Supervisory Agency? 
A review of the banking sector indicates that the major problem is not the lack of a 
separate agency but rather economic, institutional and political factors as highlighted in 
the previous chapter.  The problems stem from regulatory failure by the CBN - directly 
via negligence of duty and indirectly due to inappropriate macro-economic policies. 
Having established this fact, even with both mandates under CBN supervision, there was 
an inability to pursue their responsibilities effectively. Arguments for separation of 
supervisory duties suggest that there would be conflict of interest, excessive powers and 
reputation risks. In the peculiar Nigerian scenario, these issues do not impact regulation 
as expected because the financial market is not as developed and robust in developing 
countries. The macroeconomic fundamentals that affect the industry should rather be 
seen as policy lapses rather than conflict of interest. In terms of excessive power, CBN is 
actually a weak institution from a political economy perspective. Because the 
appointment of the governor is a political one, there has been a   lot of restraint by CBN 
governors in enforcing some of the rules. 
Regulatory capture also occurred with the CBN due to political pressure as many of the 
promoters of Nigerian banks are well connected to the ruling class. We thus had a 
situation where rather than enforce regulation banks were given liquidity support 
because of their relationship to the government. The only change that has occurred in 
Nigeria is the appointment of the current Governor who fearlessly took measures that 
were alien to the culture hitherto witnessed within the Nigerian public service 




environment. Another perspective to independence of CBN is the role and motives of 
the individual. The forthrightness and the boldness of the CBN governor have been 
attributed to the fact that he is a prince of a prominent ruling Northern family and 
therefore has the clout to tread where his predecessors did not dare. To buttress this 
point, it was the CBN governor in a speech last year that alerted Nigerians to the fact that 
their legislators were earning the equivalent of about $1.5m annually! This indeed caused 
a furore in the populace as it was rather ironic that legislators in one of the world‟s 
poorest countries were receiving almost quadruple the $400,000 annual pay of the 
President of the United States of America. The Governor was invited to the legislative 
chambers and admonished by legislators to retract this statement and in a live broadcast 
he stood by his statement and declared he was ready to be relieved of his position.  
It is noteworthy that Prof. Charles Soludo his immediate predecessor went into 
mainstream politics immediately after his tenure running for election as a state Governor 
in Nigeria. The stance of many was he had questions to answer having given the false 
impression that all was well with the banking sector whilst insinuations abound on the 
source of the funds he expended on the lavish campaign trail for his political aspirations. 
A key solution to the above problem will be a mechanism to ensure that the political 
interference is reduced to a bare minimum in the sector. One way this can be done is 
enforcing corporate governance codes in the banks and finding ways to ensure that 
financial institutions have diversified holdings. CBN recently put out a circular directing 
any Managing Director who had been in office for more than 10 years to stand down 




from the position and 3 managing directors had to leave office. This is one of the ways 
that CBN can implement effective supervision in the banks even though it remains to be 
argued if they are over stepping their boundaries. Having said this, Nigeria is a peculiar 
environment with its attendant issues and unusual policies that address this peculiarity 
should be adopted if required. An unconventional method adopted by CBN is the 
publication of debtors of the banks that had their managing directors removed in the 
national newspapers. 
Without doubt the CBN fits the criteria for a unified agency to allow for information 
synergies and a better approach for systemic risk which the ongoing reform will address 
if there is adequate implementation. It will however require the buy in of many 
governmental agencies such as the Ministries of Finance, Trade and Investment and 
Infrastructure. In a highly politicised government such as Nigeria‟s rather than cooperate 
with this laudable programme of CBN, some ministers may see it as an encroachment of 
their remit and thus not work in the best interest of the country. 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
Nigeria is a country with great potential and to achieve this potential a vibrant financial 
sector is required to drive economic growth and development. Two main areas that 
would drive this are the banking sector and the capital market, the current reform 
exercise presents an opportunity to tackle fundamental flaws in the system and reposition 
the economy for greater heights. 




It would be of immense benefit if the current reform embarked upon by the CBN is 
actually incorporated as a national agenda. The initiative is a long term one and it would 
only deliver if it is implemented as currently articulated. There is a possibility that if a 
new governor is appointed in 2014, the reform may not be followed upon and as often 
witnessed in Nigeria, the new governor may want to be seen as initiating something new 
thereby not giving the reform agenda the priority it requires. Governmental agencies will 
also need to work with the CBN in actualising the proper disbursement of the huge 
resources allotted to the developmental funds created by the CBN on infrastructure, 
manufacturing, power and aviation. Ideally one would have expected that these 
initiatives would come from the governmental agencies in charge of these areas. 
Undoubtedly, the extent of the reform required to sanitise the banking industry in 
Nigeria calls for a unified approach to the CBN mandate. The peculiar nature of the 
environment requires a holistic approach to tackle the fundamental and inter-related 
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